

- Mike: met w/ OPG re performance measurement. Agreed to use a ^{approach} measure in forecast (Canada's) for 2018; have dealers provide wklly forecasts for spreads & come up w/ cost estimate; then compare actual vs forecast.
- didn't talk about guarantee
 - want guarantee structure in place for meeting "Rating Agencies" in July.

Steve: non-specific ^{to} puts OPG as financing entity the actual financing very general.

Approach makes sense but caution to be applied.

implementation legislation not yet in place.

^{Structure} piting mixed funding shortfall + pushing repayment way in the future possibly \$200M - \$300M per tranche.

Finding mismatch in finding a place for this in the mkt place (won't find 10% asset back securitization in the mkt place)

Risk - no legal ability to pass through liab to rate payers until the curve flattens $\therefore$ refinancing risk. This risk is huge if we don't flatten the platform of buyers for this. ~~to~~ Select mkt so when it comes time to refinance $\Rightarrow$ they will have a heavy load.

Arm: flexible & open structure

so maybe put out this deal like a pension 'like' vehicle. i.e. PSP (Cdn & 10% investor)

* (discussion w/ Rating Agencies - possibly -

Gov't has understanding that there is a performance guarantee in backing IESO (not the LDCs)

Note OPG will be the holder of sub notes & sub notes with price above the senior notes.

Natural tendency: rate payers will pay whatever is needed.

- (1) Provide a foundational document: ^{Performance guarantee} promise by gov't to stand behind. IESO re: , Billing, remittance ^{from IESO extending to IESO's} covenant to LDC.

Date June 7/17

- (2) True-up structure - investor if not enough \$ flows through, we catch it up in the next mth.
- remedy shortfalls, remittance support is what TD will say people will be buying.
The last ratepayer standing will have a huge amount owing if no one else pays.

Risk gov't takes the guarantee away - via legislation or otherwise
∴ payment guarantee kicks in.

If Gov't does "bad things" org wants the debt to become the gov't or allow a put → why would you neg. that today?!!

- ① Robust performance guarantee (rate payer $\leftrightarrow$ LDC $\leftrightarrow$ IESO (\$ flows from customer to the right box))
② ^{Bullseye} Payment guarantee (that allows true up in a very limited way assuming the gov't completely reverses this structure).
Advises against a put!

Go to rating Agency when the picture is solidified (so they can't retract). Rating can't be done until the most basic thing is done
i.e. (1) regulation (maybe ^{developed} over course of summer)
(2) financing plan.

AAA is risk free! Above an Ont bond!

In Structured finance what you don't neg. w/ rating Ag. You go ready to be rated.

- Our role is to fill a contingent gap not just to pass along parts from the bond.
- Gov't don't cover if it's papered wrong
- Until you know what the servicing is to be provided, why would the gov't cover.

Date June 7/17

Senior Sub structure - undefined right now.

Performance guarantee is at the asset level (not the debt level).

Financing entity & get the guarantee not the "investor" is indenture trustee.

Prov DFA to investment in OPG via equity - Prov investment diluted in the equity of OPG.

Ken OPG issuing a different class of shares (B.V.) & so Prov. shares keep increasing if OPG ~~share~~ share price ↑
if OPG shares ↓ there is a loss to be recognized but offset by ~~somehow~~ ^{somehow} to be redeemed at the then current B.V.

Stone: Avoid open ended sentences in the drafting
Talk about details that addresses the reality ^{currently,} of the understanding that this is hypothetical.

Everything is channelled through the trust indenture

3rd performance guarantee (term sheet level OK)

(2) AAA ^{senior} security provide covenant to the extent the law changes (remove opportunistic investor from stepping in!)

(3) &

NO-standby liquidity for mkt disruption

CF - covers funding rebates; funding shortfall.

OPG is asking for an indemnity for their directors/officers of OPG as well for SPV ⇒ they & be protected against vicarious liability so not clear why they want this.

* OPG wants independence to operate w/ autonomy but wants to be responsible for anything that goes wrong.

OIC re: OFA/IESO - Fair Hydro Plan Act. Date May 23/17.
Bill 132 Act proposed - being read now by July 1/17. LRC & Cabinet
date June 27th.

+ due date for loan needs to go into the OIC.
Minister's Directive - OFA legal + LRB as FYI.

Credit Facilities to be amended \$975M to be reduced to \$475M
New credit facility to be put in place for ~~2017~~ \$2B

OICs to provide \$3.5B of authority for OFA to lend to public
bodies in IESO. \$1.5B buffer included. (not clear why)
So \$3B OIC will be needed which will provide sufficient
authority for IESO w/ a buffer which can be used by other entities

Provincial Support Agreement

Date May 2017

F/u meeting w/ MOE legal, Energy legal & Blakes. as well as Tory's / Osler's.
Beneficiaries:

Trust has a # of c-part to support the transactions.

Guarantee protects all parties; guarantee provided to trust (everyone involved in transaction).

Get more info re: trust indenture & add notes to file.

Term: depends on the underlying transactions.

Why is guarantee ^{extended} paid after everything is paid.

Guarantor: s/be both the MOE & MOF should be listed.

Performance guarantee: MSSA doesn't exist

s/be making sure collection takes place

- guaranteeing that LDC handling funds properly & no commingling of funds - but we have no authority over LDC.

This is already well in put guarantee.

- make explicit that any replacement guarantee.

- not clear what this means in last paragraph in this section.

Payment Guar.:

Needs to be able to access ABCP mkt. if no meritum & can't fund does this still hold?

Planning to use short term (ABCP) for warehousing & long term to back-stop liquidity req't.

Section (y): why is Put included? Expected based on mkt.

There will be a haircut but the bonds should be marketable.

Ask for Put to be removed

Subrogation: Legal issue may need following up as depends on structure to trustees etc.

⇒ Objective determination about trigger better than subjective.

Date May 31/17.

Malle & Toby re: Conversation w/ Blakes.

Term sheet too preliminary; Master Trust Indenture ^{done} 1st.

Performance guar: typical in finance offering to make sure mech + process works; also w/ parent & subs relationship this is common - though this is not truly a parent/sub relationship.

No direct relationship w/ LDC.

- Language vague in guarantee

- Put not a good idea; ~~error~~ is mkt disruption not appropriate & may be called on via the guar. too often.

- Tom Kinley also at the meeting

- F/u w/ TD, Blakes et to ~~to~~ determine timing & what actually needs to be done.

- seeking AAA rating - but not discussed.

Maybe in reg. - true-up - ratepayers default to LDC then ratepayers pd. more to cover the cost.

Debt transaction may not be until Nov or so.

Next Week { Meet w/ Energy + rest of Prov 1st
" " Prov & TD 2nd } trying to establish the reg'ts of this

* News release: background w/ info about guarantee