



CABINET BRIEFING NOTE AND LRC RECOMMENDATION

Energy DRAFT Ontario's Fair Hydro Plan

Cabinet (info)	TB/MBC	Cabinet	Announcement	TB/MBC	Cabinet	Introduction
Feb 15, 2017	March 1, 2017	March 1, 2017	March 2, 2017	May 9, 2017	May 10, 2017	May 11, 2017

Summary of Proposal

The proposed legislation contains no variance from Cabinet direction [TBC].

Context for Decision:

On March 2, 2017, the government announced Ontario's Fair Hydro Plan (OFHP), which would lower bills by 25% for a typical residential consumer, starting in the summer of 2017. Up to 500,000 small businesses and farms would also benefit. These measures include the 8% rebate introduced in January and builds on previously announced initiatives to deliver broad-based rate relief on electricity bills.

OFHP has the following major components:

- Refinancing the Global Adjustment (GA);
- Helping vulnerable electricity consumers;
- Extending the Industrial Conservation Initiative (ICI);
- Improving sector efficiency; and
- Modernizing Ontario's electricity market.

Since the announcement of OFHP, the Affordability Fund and ICI expansion have been implemented.

This proposal follows Cabinet direction to the Ministry of Energy to take the necessary steps to implement electricity price mitigation initiatives that support OFHP to provide additional rate relief to Ontario electricity ratepayers.

The proposed legislation, the *Ontario Fair Hydro Act, 2017*, if enacted, enables approaches to fairly allocate a portion of GA amongst specified current and future electricity rate payers, and help the most vulnerable Ontarians through enhancements to electricity support programs through government funding. To fully implement the

initiative, the Ministry of Energy will be seeking future approvals for regulations identified in the proposed bill.

The proposed legislation:

1. Establishes a framework to refinance a portion of the GA costs in order to reduce costs for eligible electricity ratepayers (“specified consumers”) in the near term while recovering these costs over the mid- to long-term:
 - July 1, 2017 to April 30, 2018, reduces after-tax electricity costs for prescribed typical consumers by 25% (inclusive of the 8% rebate and shifting of support program to be government funded).
 - May 1, 2018 to June 30, 2021, electricity rates will be prescribed by regulation. This regulation making authority would enable the government to keep increases in line with the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (See page 17- Fiscal Pressure)
 - July 1, 2021 to April 30, 2047, electricity rates will increase at a pace that ensures recovery of the accumulated debt, interest costs and administrative costs. (See page 14- Future Impacts to Electricity Rates)
 - The bill and amendments to the *Electricity Act, 1998* and the *Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998*, Ontario Power Generation (OPG), the Ontario Energy Board (OEB), and the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) are enabled to address payment, settlement and cost-recovery obligations and to manage the refinanced GA costs. (See page 19- OPG Mechanism)
2. Expands electricity support programs for the most vulnerable consumers and moves program costs from the rate base to the tax base. The bill amends the *Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998* to:
 - Move the recently expanded Ontario Electricity Support Program (OESP) to be government funded, allow for the potential transition of the program administration to the Crown or other entity, and to enable information exchange between the Ontario Disability Support Program and Ontario Works to potentially allow for automatic enrolment procedures to be established;
 - Enable the funding of existing Rural or Remote Rate Protection (RRRP) for prescribed customers to be provided for through provincial revenues, rather than from electricity customers.
 - Enable a broader government funded Distribution Rate Protection (DRP) program (broadened RRRP) which provides additional distribution rate protection to residential customers of prescribed higher cost LDCs by enabling the regulations to prescribe a maximum distribution charge.
 - Enable the provision of a government funded on-reserve First Nations Delivery Credit (FNDC), which would cover 100% of the delivery charge for on-reserve First Nation residential customers.

Terms you need to know

- **Global Adjustment (GA)** – The GA accounts for the difference between generation costs (contracted and rate-regulated) and the wholesale market price in order to recover fixed costs, including capital costs, of putting in place and operating Ontario's generation fleet, as well as the cost of conservation and demand management programs. The GA is instrumental in maintaining a reliable electricity system by ensuring that sufficient generating capacity is available.
- **Local Distribution Companies (LDCs)** – Local electricity utilities, responsible for distributing power from transmission lines to people's homes (e.g., Hydro Ottawa, Toronto Hydro, etc.) LDCs recover their costs through distribution rates. LDCs are licensed to serve a specific geographic area by the Ontario Energy Board (OEB). An LDC must receive Ontario Energy Board approval to charge a distribution rate.
- **Delivery charge** – The costs of getting electricity from generating stations to homes and businesses. Appears as one line on electricity bills, includes three components:
 - Transmission: The costs of moving electricity across high voltage lines from generating stations to the distribution system. This cost is recovered through a variable per unit charge that is approved by the OEB.
 - Distribution: The costs of moving electricity from the transmission system to homes and businesses. Depending on the LDC, distribution costs makes up about 60% to 80% of the Delivery line. This cost is currently recovered through both a variable charge and fixed charge, approved by the OEB. Distribution rates for residential customers are moving to a fully-fixed charge by 2019 for most LDCs. Some LDCs, such as Hydro One and Algoma Power are transitioning over a longer period.
 - Line Loss: The costs to recover electricity that is lost when it is delivered over a power line.
- **Regulated Price Plan (RPP)** – Since April 2005, the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) has administered an electricity price plan that provides stable and predictable electricity pricing, encourages conservation and ensures the price consumers pay for electricity better reflects the price paid to generators. This pricing plan is known as the Regulated Price Plan (RPP). About 5 million residential consumers, small businesses and farms are eligible for the RPP.
- **Customer classification for Hydro One** – Customer service classes are determined by the kind of electricity service as well as by density – how many customers there are in the area and the number of customers per kilometre of line. Lower customer density increases the cost to serve. Residential class R1 customers are considered 'medium density' customers and residential class R2 are considered 'low density customers.' Hydro One also served urban residential customers, considered "high density" through its UR class. Hydro One also has urban and non-urban general service classes.
- **Ontario Power Generation (OPG)** – A business corporation owned by the Province that owns and operates generation assets, including nuclear and hydro, and

generates almost half of Ontario's electricity.

- **Ontario Energy Board (OEB)** – A Crown Agency that independently regulates Ontario's electricity and natural gas sectors in the public interest. Implements an open and transparent process to allow for stakeholders to participate in quasi-judicial proceedings and formal stakeholder consultations.
- **Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO)** – An independent corporation established under the *Electricity Act, 1998* that operates the electricity market in Ontario. Balances the supply of and demand for electricity in Ontario and then directs its flow across the province's transmission lines, including interties with other jurisdictions.
- **Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)** – A Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) sometimes referred to as a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) is an off-balance sheet legal entity created by the sponsor or originator. SPVs can be viewed as a method of isolating the risks of an underlying pool of exposures held by the sponsor and reallocating them to the SPV and often investors. This allows investors access to investment opportunities which would not otherwise exist, and provides a new source of revenue generation for the sponsor. (Source: [PWC](#))
- **Security Interest** – A security interest is a type of property interest created by agreement or by operation of law over assets to secure the performance of an obligation, usually the payment of a debt. It gives the beneficiary of the security interest certain preferential rights in the disposition of secured assets.

Why does Ontario need these changes? Why now?

Addressing rising electricity prices is among the highest priorities for Ontarians. On March 2, 2017, the Ontario government announced OFHP, and since then, there has been increased media attention and public pressure for the government to bring forward the legislation which would enact the commitments made in the Plan. The government has committed to implement further rate relief measures by the summer 2017. On April 20, 2017, the OEB announced that, starting in May, electricity rates would be 17% lower than would have otherwise been without the 8% rebate (OREC), the anticipated move of OESP costs to government funding, and a portion of the reductions estimated under Ontario's Fair Hydro Plan based on a comfort letter sent from the Minister of Energy.

What is the expected cost to government?

The total cost of the proposal is \$499M funded through the fiscal plan

TABLE 1: Cost Impact (\$M)	2017-18	2018-19	2019-20	2020-21
Moving Social Programs to Government-Funded (details provided in the chart below)	499	753	829	892

***Note:** GA Financing includes equity injection from the province to OPG. \$1.1B investment operating asset in 2017-18 (Ministry has received appropriation)

The GA refinancing portion of the bill establishes a structure in which IESO records the GA cost recovery deferral as a regulatory asset (regulated by the OEB). IESO may then sell the regulatory asset, at which time it becomes an investment asset. The investment asset owner (OPG Trust/Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or “financing entities”) may then further sell or securitize all or part of the investment asset to other parties in exchange for a funding obligation. Under this structure, OPG, acting as the “Financial Services Manager,” would therefore take on the risk and responsibility of financing the deferral by purchasing monthly regulatory assets from IESO. OPG would finance these purchases through a combination of an equity investment by the Province flowed through the OFA [TBC] (\$1.1 B in 2017-18; See Table 1) and external private sector financing. The structure would increase gross debt of the Province (to finance the equity injection in OPG), increase net investment in OPG (so no net debt impact), increase interest on debt related to that external debt, and increase earnings of OPG to offset the increase in interest costs. The Province’s net debt will remain unchanged as the equity investment in OPG will offset the additional Provincial borrowing. This is expected to be fiscally neutral to the Province.

The estimate for the combined impact of the support programs for the most vulnerable consumers would begin in 2017/18 and is expected to be \$499M in 2017/18, growing to \$753M in 2018/19 and rising. This investment has been factored into the 2017 Ontario Budget’s fiscal plan. These estimates are based on variable inputs such as program uptake, future energy consumption of various consumer groups and future distribution rates, and are therefore subject to change.

TABLE 2: Fiscal Impact (M) of Social Programs	2017-18 Budget
Rural or Remote Rate Protection	\$344
Ontario Electricity Support Program	\$140
On-Reserve First Nations Delivery Credit	\$15

Note: As approved in the TB/MBC submission of March 1, 2017 and confirmed in Vote-Item 2905-1, the financial impacts of the social programs for the period July 1 2017- March 31, 2018. ENERGY will return updated out-year figures following program implementation

There is inherent risk in the financial estimates given the number of variables that are included in the calculations (e.g. cost of borrowing, electricity demand, electricity market conditions and accounting assumptions). In addition, electricity prices are forecast to exceed forecast residential monthly bills by about 10 per cent each year from what otherwise would have been from 2028 to 2047 (**Note:** values are subject to change; See page 13- Expected Impacts on Electricity Costs). The public may expect that the government is committed to reducing or holding constant the absolute cost of electricity for consumers in the longer term. Under the mechanism, the government would not have the ability to direct further changes to the rate of repayment for GA refinancing, which would limit the government’s options to address electricity rate concerns in the future (See page 17- Fiscal Pressure).

What are the key steps to deliver this proposal?

- May 11, 2017 - Introduce legislation.
- Spring- Summer 2017- Energy to work with IESO, OEB, OPG, OFA and LDCs on the implementation of OFHP.
- Energy will post a proposal to the regulatory registry in early May outlining proposed new regulations and amendments needed to support the implementation of OFHP.
- Early June, 2017 [TBC]- Energy to bring regulations to TB/MBC.
- Early June, 2017 [TBC]- Energy to bring regulations to LRC/Cabinet.
- July 1st, 2017- the remaining reductions and initiatives associated with the OFHP would take effect. Programs that are not established on this day for technical implementation issues will have benefits that are retroactively applied to customers once program is operational in individual LDCs.

How will the changes be communicated?

On March 2, 2017, the Premier announced OFHP, which would lower electricity bills by 25 per cent for all residential customers including many small businesses and farms. Communications was sustained through minister announcements, local MPP echoes, a radio campaign, and a webpage that features all the programs and initiatives the government is taking to reduce electricity costs.

On May 11, 2017, there will be a news release to announce the introduction of legislation to implement OFHP. Phase two of the marketing campaign will start this summer and will include radio and television.

A robust issues management plan will be developed to mitigate the GA financing risks.

Notes and Recommendation from LRC

LRC item direct to Cabinet.

Cabinet Office Analysis

The proposed legislation allows for the implementation of the key elements of Ontario's Fair Hydro Plan (OFHP) announced on March 2, 2017 to provide further rate relief to Ontario electricity ratepayers. The Global Adjustment (GA) refinancing proposal will provide, on average, 25% in electricity rate relief (including the 8% announced in 2016 and shifting of support program costs to the tax base) to "specified consumers" (i.e., residential, farms, small businesses, condominiums, long-term care homes and co-operative housing as prescribed between July 1, 2017 and April 31, 2018 ("The Fair Adjustment"). Electricity rates would then change by amounts prescribed in the regulations under the bill. Regulation making authority would enable the government to keep rate increases in line with Consumer Price Index (CPI) between May 1, 2018 and June 30, 2021 (see legal risks below). Additional relief will be provided to Ontarians

most in need through enhancements to electricity support programs through government funding.

1. Refinancing the Global Adjustment

The proposed legislation establishes the framework to refinance a portion of the current GA costs to future ratepayers by recognizing the longer term benefit many of these generating assets to the electricity system. The methodology is based on the assumption that some assets are expected to continue to provide benefit to future ratepayers beyond the term of current contracts (typically 20 years), and that future ratepayers are expected to continue to be able to utilize and benefit from these assets in the future. Similarly, conservation costs are currently recovered through the GA in the year they occurred while conservation initiatives can provide benefits to the system over many years.

The *Fair Hydro Act, 2017* attempts to balance several key factors including financeability, accounting treatment and legal considerations by:

- Supporting financeability through a number of features, including a provincial undertaking not to interfere with clean energy adjustments once determined, which will be backstopped by a guarantee, and provisions intended to reduce borrowing costs and attract a wide investor base;
- Addressing the necessary accounting requirements through mechanisms to record funding, interest and the transfer of regulatory assets to avoid a fiscal impact to the province; and
- Mitigating legal risk by developing a methodology that attempts to ensure an alignment of costs with benefits to future rate payers.

According to a legal opinion by former Supreme Court Justice Binnie, there is a moderately high risk that the proposed change would be characterized as an unconstitutional tax rather than a valid regulatory charge because future consumers are being required to subsidize current consumers (See page 16- Legal Risk).

The bill establishes a structure in which the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) records the GA cost recovery deferral as a “regulatory asset” (regulated by the Ontario Energy Board (OEB)), supported at its foundation by the fact that the refinancing of the GA is not a reduction in the GA, but rather a deferral to be collected at a future time from “specified consumers” (“the Fair Adjustment” and “IESO deferral”). “Specified consumers” would receive a reduction in electricity rates from July 1, 2017 to June 30, 2018 as based on a 25% reduction for a prescribed typical residential consumer. IESO may then sell the regulatory asset, at which time it becomes an “investment asset.” The investment asset owner (OPG Trust/Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or “financing entities”) may then further sell or securitize all or part of the regulatory asset to other parties in exchange for a funding obligation.

The Minister, following the principles in the bill, would regularly calculate the “Fair Allocation Amount” to ensure a proper match of the allocation of the intergenerational costs and benefits in relation to each on the next 60 six month “reference periods.” The

financings will be backed primarily by the clean energy adjustments payable by specified consumers. The “clean energy adjustments” will track the actual payment obligations incurred by the financing entities when they become due and payable. OPG, in its role as the Financial Services Manager will calculate the aggregate clean energy adjustment payable in each month of the reference period, and to ensure intergenerational fairness, these amounts will be managed to align with the fair allocation amounts determined by the Minister. The OEB would calculate the rates at which the clean energy adjustment could be collected from specified consumers. To recoup the costs associated with the fair adjustment, consumers would be invoiced the Clean Energy Adjustment on their electricity bills through existing IESO and Local Distribution Companies (LDC) processes, which will be channeled through to pay each financing entity’s related funding obligations.

OPG is planning to create a SPV or Trust to finance the GA refinancing. To maintain the integrity of the structure, OPG must have the ability to appoint and remove the Trustee (or Board of Trustees) of the SPV/Trust, with no veto right by the Province. No party shall have the ability to remove OPG from its role and authority in the SPV/Trust. The SPV/Trust will be consolidated by OPG, giving OPG the appropriate powers to impact its exposure to variability of the income in the SPV/Trust. OPG will have the ability to direct the financing of the SPV/Trust and both benefit from its financing strategy and be at risk as a result of it.

Once the OPG Trust/SPV has purchased the regulatory asset, which is under no obligation to do, it will ultimately take on the risk and responsibility of financing the deferral through debt financed from OPG and external sources. OPG’s debt would be funded through a combination of an equity investment by the Province through the OFA (See page 4: Table 1) and external financing through sale or securitization of the investment asset. The structure would result in increased gross debt of the Province (to finance the equity injection in OPG), increased interest on debt related to that Provincial debt, increased net investment in OPG (to offset the Provincial borrowing for no net debt impact), and increased earnings of OPG (to offset the interest on debt).

The legislation also provides that no action or omission by the OEB, the Minister, or the Crown is effective to reduce, impair, postpone or terminate the obligations of specified consumers to pay the clean energy adjustment. Additionally, to support the program, the Ontario will be expected to provide certain performance guarantees, indemnities and bond-purchase covenants. The legislation enables these agreements. The terms of these obligations will be worked out over time in connection with the marketing of financings through OPG. The goal will be to achieve the highest rated securities, although that will largely depend on issues such as the strength of the Ontario’s undertakings not to adversely affect the program through subsequent legislation.

The potential cost to government associated with providing this type of guarantee and the cost of borrowing from private lenders is unknown at this time. It should be noted that the external borrowing by the OPG Trust will be at a higher interest cost than Provincial borrowing costs, which would affect the carrying costs that would need to be recovered from ratepayers in the future.

Key elements of this component of the bill include:

Specified Consumers:

- The defined group of consumers to whom the “Fair Adjustment” applies. Prescribed consumers include residential consumers, farms, small businesses, condominiums, long-term care homes and co-operative housing,. These are primarily consumers eligible for the RPP.

Fair Adjustment

- The adjustment to rates, starting on July 1, 2017, to ensure intergenerational fairness.
- July 1, 2017- April 30, 2018- reduction in rates for “specified consumers” based on a 25% reduction for a prescribed typical consumer.
- May 1, 2018- June 30, 2021- the bill allows for rates to be set by regulation (See page 17- Fiscal Pressure).

Fair Allocation Amount

- Principles established in the bill require proper alignment over time between the costs of providing facilities for clean electricity generation and conservation “clean energy costs” and the consumers who benefit from these investments in the system.
- The Minister of Energy sets the fair allocation amount, and is required to:
 - Fairly measure and allocate the estimated clean energy costs (and the clean energy benefits) among the “specified consumers” for applicable “reference periods” (typically every 6 months); and
 - Take into account (in the fair allocation) funding obligations (financing) that have been incurred (largely arising from the redistribution of cost across generations of consumers) (Page 16- Legal Risk; See page 17- Fiscal Pressure);
 - Align these costs with clean energy benefits expected to be received by rate payers in the future.
- Subsequent calculations may be undertaken by other agents as prescribed.

Clean Energy Adjustment

- Determined by Financial Services Manager (OPG), the clean energy adjustment is the amount that will be recovered from consumers in the future to pay principal, interest, transaction costs and administrative costs associated with the fair adjustment and consistent with the fair allocation amount.
- Will be subject to true-up process that will reconcile actual amounts collected with expected amounts.

- July 1, 2017- June 30, 2021- OPG to internally capitalize the costs related to the fair adjustment, which will result in increased financing costs during this time.
- June 1, 2021- April 30, 2047- to be invoiced to consumers and collected as part of the electricity bills through existing IESO and LDC processes.
- In accordance with the regulations, the OEB to set the rate at which specified consumers are invoiced to recover the clean energy adjustment.

Regulatory Asset and Investment Asset


- A regulatory asset is created as IESO defers its right collect a portion of the rates that it would have otherwise received from customers/LDCs if not for the implementation of the Fair Adjustment.
- Subject to OEB approval, IESO records the funding shortfall as a regulatory asset, as IESO would also have collection rights to recover the funding shortfall, which may be sold. Collection rights are deferred until July 1, 2021.
- The Financing Plan contemplates the Financial Services Manager (OPG) establishing financing entities (OPG Trust/SPV) to buy the regulatory asset and the associated rights in exchange for a payment to IESO. IESO would use the payment to offset the funding shortfall.
- This purchase and sale turns the regulatory asset into an investment asset for the investment asset owner. The transfer includes the rights to collect amounts related to the clean energy adjustment in a manner consistent with the bill.
- The investment interest owner may further sell all or a portion of its rights and interests,. An investment interest owner may also grant a security interest over all or a portion of its right, title and interests to secure a funding obligation.
- After 4 years (July 1, 2021) the IESO has the right to collect its funding shortfall from ratepayers in the event that a portion of the regulatory asset is not bought and sold. If the regulatory asset is not sold, the IESO would require an alternative source of financing. IESO has requested a credit facility from the Ontario Financing Authority (OFA) (See page 17- Fiscal Pressure).
- The rights associated with the investment asset require IESO and LDCs to collect money from rate payers as agent of the investment asset owner.

Financing Plan

- In practical terms, the Financing Plan is intended to show how debt (with varying degrees of incurrence dates, maturities and interest rates) will be used over time.
- Prepared by the Financial Services Manager (OPG) the Financing Plan is intended to set out when a “funding obligation” (financing) should be incurred so that the (OPG) financing entity can raise money to acquire the “investment interest” from IESO. Plan to be provided to the Minister of Energy.

Crown Undertaking (Guarantee or Backstop)

- The bill provides that no action or omission of the Crown, the OEB, or the Minister would be effective to reduce, impair, or postpone or terminate the obligations of specified consumers to pay the clean energy adjustment.
- The Ministers of Energy and Finance together, with LGIC approval, may enter into agreements for compensation with any person in respect of the bill, including agreements regarding the performance of the IESO or electricity vendors under the bill.
- The Ministers of Energy and Finance together, with LGIC approval, may agree to guarantee and indemnify any debts, obligations, securities or undertakings associated with the investment interest.

Figure 1: Financing Structure

Note: CEAs are "clean energy adjustments".

External Opinions

The proposed structure has been extensively reviewed by KPMG (Energy advisor and IESO auditor), and the firm has provided an accounting opinion confirming the validity of the structure under Public Sector Accounting Board (PSAB) standards. KPMG advises that the variance account created by the proposed legislation meets the accounting criteria for the recognition of a “regulatory asset”. Rather than making the KPMG opinion public, which is highly technical and contains information pertaining to the proposed legislation, the Ministry is considering alternatives options. . If the government intends to keep rate increases to the pace of CPI from 2018 to 2021, this may require recourse to the fiscal plan to maintain the constitutionality of the GA refinancing structure.

For clarity, the below requirements were required to be met to ensure the structure was defensible. Based on the opinions received, Energy is confident that these requirements have been met: [TBC]

- IESO requirements :
 - IESO can recognize a regulatory asset for the shortfall between the amounts collected from the LDCs and the amounts paid to the PGs using GAAP hierarchy to support regulatory asset under PSAB;
 - IESO can derecognize regulatory asset upon sale to OPG;
 - “Market books” are reflected on corporate books; and,
 - OEB to act as regulator.
- OPG requirements:
 - OPG Trust/SPV purchases regulatory asset from IESO – classifies as intangible asset;
 - OPG consolidates Trust/SPV; and
 - OPG retains GBE status.

However, despite the fact that the structure has satisfied the fiscal, and accounting requirements outlined in the policy submission, there remain some fundamental risks that the province would need to accept:

- The structure is unique in Canada and possibly the world, which increases the risk or unknown factors impacting its performance. The use of securities mechanisms to address debt is more common in the United States, but officials are currently unaware of any example that would compare to the size, complexity, or fluidity of what is proposed;
- Complexity of the structure and length of deferral/recovery increases risk and decrease transparency;
- Government would have no ability to control electricity prices resulting from these changes outside of recourse to the fiscal plan;

- Government would not know the price of private borrowing that would be required for the OPG Trust to work and will have limited control over OPG's direct operations as the Financial Services Manager. While removal of the Financial Services Manager is provided for in the bill, in practice this may prove problematic once the system is operational; and,
- Private lenders and rating agencies may disagree with the assessment of the size of the Fair Allocation Amount which would increase the risk of the asset and therefore its saleability. This could in turn, decrease the amount of rate reduction achievable under this mechanism.

External Legal Advice

The Ministry retained Blakes to provide external legal advice in the development of the legislation. The Blakes team provided securitization, constitutional law, energy sector and government expertise. This team was integral to balancing the accounting, legal and finaceability imperatives, as well as differing interests among OPG, IESO, OEB and investment dealers, in crafting the legislation.

Blakes will continue to advise through the development of regulations and the commercial agreements that will ensue.

2. Enhancing electricity supports for vulnerable Ontarians and shifting costs from rate payer funded to government funded:

Moving the Ontario Electricity Support Program (OESP) under Government Funding:

The OESP is an income-tested, application based program that lowers electricity costs of the most vulnerable consumers by providing a rebate directly on electricity bills. The program was launched in January 2016 and has had roughly 30% enrolment. Consistent with Cabinet direction, the program was recently expanded to increase the existing benefit credit amounts by 50% and provide additional credits to more households.

Under the expanded program the basic OESP benefit scale increased from \$30-\$50 to \$35-\$75 a month and the enhanced OESP benefit scale would increase from \$45-\$75 to \$52-\$113 a month for eligible consumers.

The proposed bill amends the *Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998* to allow for the program to transition from the rate base to the government funding, and allow for the potential transition of the program administration to the Crown or other entity. The cost to the fiscal plan would be \$186 million in 2017/18. The bill provides further amendments designed to allow information sharing between the Ontario Works (OW) and the Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) and the entity responsible for OESP. The intention is that this information sharing will allow for the automatic enrolment of individuals that are already enrolled under the ODSP, but it is currently unknown to what extent this will significantly impact the enrolment under the program.

The ministry is continuing to work with MCSS to increase the uptake of the program and automate enrolment of current social assistance clients.

Enhancing RRRP (Delivery Charge Relief) and Moving to Government Funding:

RRRP helps to offset the higher costs to distribute electricity to Ontario residents who live in rural or remote locations all across the Province. Currently, RRRP is a \$290M program paid for by the ratepayers. For an average residential customer, the cost of supporting RRRP is roughly \$1.58 per month. For other customers, the cost to support the RRRP can range from \$65 for a greenhouse to \$8,000 for a medium industrial.

The proposed bill amends the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998 to enable the funding of existing Rural or Remote Rate Protection (RRRP) for prescribed customers to be provided for through provincial revenues, rather than from electricity customers. The intention is to draft regulations permitted under this section to move the portion of RRRP costs used to support Hydro One R2 customers from rate payers to government funding. This is the majority of the cost associated with RRRP.

The bill would further amend the *Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998* to enable the creation of a government funded distribution rate protection program and the ability to prescribe a maximum distribution charge for prescribed classes of residential customers for certain prescribed high cost distributors. The intention is to draft regulations permitted under this section of the bill to prescribe residential customers of the following LDCs to receive distribution rate protection: Hydro One R1 and R2 rate classes, Algoma Power (excluding reclassified residential customers), Atikokan Hydro, Sioux Lookout Hydro, Lakeland Power – Parry Sound, InnPower, Chapleau PUC, and Northern Ontario Wires.

The prescribed LDCs would continue to collect the revenue they are entitled to through the OEB approved distribution charge. The shortfall between the set maximum charge collected from customers and the approved OEB charge would be made up of out provincial funds. The OEB would continue its usual rate setting activities for prescribed LDCs, as authorized under the *Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998*. However, prescribed customers of prescribed LDCs would pay no more than the maximum charge determined by the OEB. These enhancements are expected to benefit approximately 800,000 customers in Ontario.

Targeted broadened RRRP consumers would see additional savings on their monthly bill that would vary based on their consumption level and cost to fiscal plan would be \$344 million in 2017/18. If the legislation and required regulations are passed, the program would become active as of July 1, 2017. It is possible that for technical reasons not all LDCs will be able to implement the changes required under the program in time for the July 1 effective date. In these cases, regulations will dictate that, once the changes have been made (required by October 1, 2017 at the latest), the LDC would provide a lump sum credit to customers that would otherwise have been eligible for benefits under the program starting July 1, 2017.

On-reserve First Nations Delivery Credit

First Nation and Political-Territorial Organization leaders have advocated for the need for electricity rate relief for on-reserve customers and the review of delivery charges associated with transmission and distribution within the context of historical grievances. In this instance, historic grievances relate to lands affected by energy developments.

The proposed bill amends the *Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998* to require the creation of a tax base funded delivery credit program for on-reserve customers with the details to be prescribed in the regulations. The intention is to enact regulations that would eliminate the delivery charge for all on-reserve First Nation residential customers served by licenced electricity distributors and eliminate the monthly service charge for customers of licensed distributors which charge a bundled rate.

Eligible recipients would be automatically enrolled in the program. The OEB estimates that, on average, customers would receive a monthly benefit of \$85. The program will cost approximately \$20M annually and provides for a July 1, 2017 effective date. It is possible that for technical reasons not all LDCs will be able to implement the changes required under the program in time for the July 1 effective date. In these cases, the bill dictates that, once the changes have been made (required by October 1, 2017 at the latest), the LDC would provide a lump sum credit to customers that would otherwise have been eligible for benefits under the program starting July 1, 2017.

Expected Impacts of the Proposal on Electricity bills:

The impact of proposed legislation to a typical eligible customer's bill in July 2017 is an 25% decrease combined with the 8% from ORECA effective January 1, 2017 and shifting of the funding of OESP and RRRP to provincial revenues), followed by an increase in price over time. Between May 2018 and June 2021 electricity rates will be set in accordance with a methodology established by regulation which would enable rate increases to be kept in line with CPI .(see page 19 – Legal Risk) Customers that are eligible for the RRRP enhancement, OESP, and the First Nations On-Reserve Delivery Credit will see further reductions in their electricity rates beyond the average 25% (as much as 40-50%).

DRAFT-V5-WITHOUT MATERIALS

Residential (750 kWh/month)	Actual 2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Total Bill (includes HST)	158	164	167	170	181	178
Total Bill (excludes HST)	140	145	148	150	160	158
Impact of GA Financing		-26	-26	-26	-32	-28
Impact of Tax-Basing Social Programs		-2	-2	-2	-3	-3
Subtotal		117	120	122	125	127
8% rebate		-9	-10	-10	-10	-10
HST		15	16	16	16	17
Revised Bill (includes HST)	158	123	126	128	131	133
Year-over-Year Change		-22%	2%	2%	2%	2%
Change from Forecast		-25%	-25%	-25%	-28%	-25%

Commercial & Small Industrial (\$/MWh)	Actual 2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Class B Total (excludes HST)	160	165	160	162	173	169
Class B Revised Total (excludes HST)	160	162	157	159	170	166
Year-over-Year Change		1%	-3%	1%	7%	-2%
Change from Forecast		-2%	-2%	-2%	-2%	-2%

Large Industrial (\$/MWh)	Actual 2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Class A Total (excludes HST)	90	91	93	88	95	96
Class A Revised Total (excludes HST)	90	88	90	84	92	93
Year-over-Year Change		-2%	2%	-6%	9%	1%
Change from Forecast		-4%	-4%	-4%	-4%	-4%


Risks and Considerations:

Future Impacts to Electricity Rates

Borrowing money to refinance GA costs for ratepayers would lower costs in the short term but result in substantial debt and higher electricity prices in the future. Based on the GA deferral portion of the plan, electricity prices would increase to about 10% [TBC] above the forecast cost of electricity which would have otherwise been paid over the recovery period (peaking at 13% [TBC]). The proposal may create the expectation that the government is committed to reducing or holding constant the cost of electricity for consumers. The government would not have the ability to control this portion of electricity rates in the future outside of recourse to the fiscal plan.

Figure 2: Forecast and Historical Electricity Rates 2010-2050 [TBC]

DRAFT-V5-WITHOUT MATERIALS



Notes: Assumes 30 year financing period and a nominal interest rate of 5% (compounded monthly). Ratepayer GA payments increase annually beyond 2021 such that the average monthly residential electricity bill increases by 6.5% per year with a limit of \$2.2 billion above the true cost of GA in any given year to cap repayment charges at a maximum of 13% of total bill. IESO forecast is based on IESO's revised OPO forecast as of February 2017. Includes the cancellation of LRP II and EFW, expansion of ICI. Does not include smoothed OPG rates. Above residential bill is based on a 750 kWh per month Toronto Hydro customer. Fair Allocation Amounts are subject to third party review.

The government may be criticized for creating a new debt structure which could be compared to the previous debt retirement charge (DRC). The debt retirement charge was removed from residential bills in January 2016 and was removed for remaining customers in April 2018.

Future repayment cost estimates are based on a static assumed interest rate of 5%, and forecast electricity market conditions and demand levels. GA refinancing assumptions are also based on a Toronto Hydro average customer's residential bill at 750 kWh per month. This "fictional rate regulated consumer's" bill is primarily comprised of system costs and the commodity cost for electricity. Should the system costs for a Toronto Hydro customer's bill increase, the commodity price would need to be reduced accordingly to align with the 25% reduction commitment and require more borrowing. Declining demand levels due to conservation, technology adoption, and self-generation would increase the costs borne by remaining customers to decrease the debt associated with GA financing. IESO forecasted demand has historically been over-projected which also increases the risk of the static demand assumption. To partly mitigate against the risk that increased self-generation poses, the bill provides that the Clean Energy Adjustment may not be "set-off." In other words, it would exist as a separate and distinct component of the bill that could not be reduced by methods such as net-metering. Lastly, should interests rates increase above 5% after 2020, residential bills would also significantly increase during the repayment phase of the plan. All of these factors increase the risk that the province would have to absorb some of the debt in the future.

Not all generating assets will continue operations at the end of their contract. If the Fair Allocation Amount is not properly designed, future rate payers will be paying the cost for assets that are no longer in use, which would be unconstitutional, unless legislatively authorised as a tax (See page 16- Legal Risk). High capital costs, equipment obsolescence or surplus capacity / low demand conditions mean that some generators may shut down at the end of their contract. Future ratepayers would be paying for these assets that no longer produce power in paying down the deferred GA

and accumulated interest costs, and it would need to be justified that these assets are still providing some kind of benefit to the system after they cease operation.

Accounting and Provincial Credit Rating and Borrowing

The significant amount of additional provincial borrowing needed to refinance the GA and associated risks and fiscal costs (interest rates, repayment timelines) could put pressure on the Province's credit rating and overall borrowing capacity.

The complexity of the structure and length of deferral (i.e., recovery of debt) increase the overall risk of the proposal and decrease transparency to the public. The structure of the GA deferral was designed to result in an (1) increase in provincial borrowing (2) no increase in net debt, and (3) no impact on annual surplus/deficit. However, depending on funding to OPG from the Province, an increase in interest on debt and an increase on income from OPG will result. The structure is also contingent on the size of the GA deferral that is seen as possible, which, as previously mentioned, increases the likelihood of pressures on the fiscal plan in the near future. (See page 17- Fiscal Pressure)

Rating agencies and investors in the Province's debt may view all of the borrowing (whether by the Province directly or the OPG Trust) as an obligation of the Province. Depending on the magnitude of the debt incurred, the Province's borrowing cost may be impacted.

The structure of the guarantees from the Province that will be required by the market at the transaction stage may also impact the accounting analysis. These will be negotiated at a later stage.

The Ontario Auditor General (OAG) has been briefed on the proposal and has had access to the March 1, 2017 policy submission for Ontario's Fair Hydro Plan. While the auditors of OPG and IESO have provided their assessments and the Office of the Provincial Controller Division (OPCD) has been engaged, the OAG has historically raised concern with "rate regulated accounting" and may take this into account when the provincial books are audited (i.e., it may impact whether the OAG qualifies the provincial books).

Based on early assessments, only a maximum of 18% rate relief [TBC] can be justified by amortizing contracts over the useful life of the underlying assets. Reducing electricity rates up to or beyond this amount is dependent on increased borrowing. All of the deferral is dependent on increased borrowing.

Legal Risk – constitutionality of financing the GA

The current GA amount paid by consumers is a regulatory charge. One of the requirements of a valid regulatory charge (as opposed to a tax) is that the person paying the charge either benefits from the regulatory scheme or causes the need for regulation. In principle, refinancing a portion of the GA to spread the costs of generation and conservation assets over the useful life of the assets presents only a low risk of being a

tax, as each cohort of consumers pays for a proportion of the GA cost roughly equal to the proportion of the benefit they receive from the useful life of the assets.

Former Supreme Court Justice Binnie has provided legal analysis of this proposal, stating that the amount that could be constitutionally financed as a regulatory charge as opposed to a tax would need to reflect the true value of the underlying assets being amortized over a longer period of time. Shifting too much of the current GA costs to future generations would jeopardize the nature of this being a regulatory charge.

A proposal for refinancing the GA that appears to cross-subsidize near-term consumers at the expense of long-term consumers by back-loading costs more than if costs were spread equally over the estimated lifespan of generation and conservation assets presents a moderately high risk (more likely than not) of constituting a tax. If the government fails to establish that the relevant electricity generating assets will continue to perform economically over the 30 year period, or if the GA charge is in the opinion of the Court disproportionately backend loaded, the GA will not qualify as a regulatory charge (and would be characterized as a tax). Were the charge characterized as a tax, in the event of a challenge, it would be struck down by a court as unconstitutional and consumers would be entitled to recover their payments. This risk could be eliminated, either up front or retroactively, by the imposition of a valid tax.

The degree of constitutional risk is in direct proportion to the extent the government is not able to show a proper match between the cost of providing facilities for electricity generation and the group of consumers who benefit year to year from electricity generated by those facilities. By shifting costs to the 20-30 year customers, the government may in reality be disproportionately back-end loading the GA with the effect that the 20-30 year consumers will be subsidizing the 1-20 year consumers. In short, the bigger the reduction in charges to current consumers, the greater the constitutional risk.

Mr. Binnie concluded that the proposed charge faces a moderately high risk of being characterized as an unauthorized tax rather than as valid regulatory charge because (1) there is a disproportionate back-end loading of the charge on 2021-2047 consumers for the benefit of 2017-2021 consumers and (2) because an unknown number of generating assets whose financing costs will be partly recovered from 2021-2047 consumers will not benefit them as they will no longer be in operation. The bill includes provisions to allow for the balance of the legislation to remain in effect if any particular clause or section is struck down by a court.

In addition, the structure of the GA refinancing means that the infrastructure included as part of the clean energy adjustment (i.e. amortized over 30 instead of 20 years) will need to be in service over the entire 30 year amortization period or provide benefits to the system in some way over the whole period. In practice this may mean that the government will have limited ability to alter the generation mixture included under the clean energy adjustment, including natural gas generation facilities, which may at some point be seen as inconsistent with the province's commitments to reduce greenhouse gasses.

The legislation has been drafted to mitigate the constitutional law risks to the extent possible, by creating a structure which requires the Minister of Energy to calculate the benefits that future rate payers are expected to receive from clean energy initiatives and allocate costs associated with the clean energy initiative to ensure that the costs that people will pay in the future are roughly proportional to the benefits that they receive. However, while this structure mitigates the risk, it does not eliminate it and ongoing decisions about the amount of costs to be deferred into the future will have an ongoing impact on the constitutionality of this program.

Fiscal Pressure

This proposal aligns with the 2017 Budget fiscal plan, but involves significant ongoing risks. Parts of the proposal do not include a scheduled review period or an end date, resulting in an ongoing fiscal pressure, which may increase in the out years, and could only be removed by a legislative amendment.

The cost projections in this proposal are highly sensitive to interest rates and other assumptions:

- The proposal assumes GA refinancing does not have a fiscal impact because the associated legal authority and accounting treatment requirements are met. If the costs of GA refinancing were accounted for as an expense to the fiscal plan, the fiscal impact would be significant (\$2.5B in 2017-18 [TBC], and escalating annually; See Table 1).
- The term and timing of the GA refinancing are highly dependent on the IESO's forecast of GA costs and actual interest rates.

The extent of fiscal pressures is also dependent on other factors (i.e., OAG could qualify Ontario's books or issue an adverse opinion). Due to the complexity and size of the proposal, the government has commissioned external opinions on the legal, fiscal, and accounting requirements. [Energy's advisor and-DELETE] IESO auditor, KPMG, has provided an accounting opinion that the principles of the structure are sound. KPMG advises that the variance account created by the proposed legislation meets the accounting criteria for the recognition of a "regulatory asset". Rather than making the KPMG opinion public, which is highly technical and contain information pertaining to the proposed legislation, the Ministry is considering alternatives options. This opinion may not change the likelihood of a contrary opinion by the OAG, but does provide a tool for government to point to in justifying its decisions.

There is also a risk that credit rating agencies and the market may take a [n alternate-DELETE] view as to the size of the GA deferral that is possible before becoming unconstitutional. If the fair adjustment and fair allocation amount exceeds this outlook, it may increase the perceived risk of the investment asset and therefore its financeability/saleability, which would result in reduced market uptake and reduce the amount of near term rate reduction that would be achievable under this mechanism. This is why the increases in electricity rates between May 2018 and June 2021 are to be set

by regulation as opposed to legislating that they increase by CPI. It may not be possible to legally hold the rate reductions to increase by CPI, and if the government wanted to hold to this commitment, the difference would need to come out of the tax base, which has not been forecasted nor included in the fiscal plan. Each percentage point of reduction that the structure cannot provide would result in an approximate \$150M [TBC] cost to the tax base annually.

Further, if the IESO is not able to sell the regulatory asset (i.e., the OPG SPV is unable to get financing to purchase it), then the IESO would require financing from an alternative source. The IESO has requested a backstop credit facility from the OFA. This would be associated with a fiscal impact risk.

There may be also some criticism that additional fiscal pressure and risk is being taken to benefit some customers that are not in as much need of rate relief as others (i.e., those that own second homes or cottages).

Legislative Officers

The Ontario Auditor General (OAG) has expressed views on rate regulated accounting, which will likely be raised again upon the implementation of this suite of initiatives. The OAG was provided copies of the Cabinet Submission seeking policy approval for Ontario's Fair Hydro Plan and has been briefed by officials from the Ministry of Energy. The OAG will have opportunities to publicly state her views through the Public Accounts committee in the summer of 2018 and in her pre-election report.

Data and assumptions that underpin the GA Financing proposal have been submitted to the Financial Accountability Officer (FAO). The FAO is expected to have an opinion on how this proposal may impact the state of the province's finances.

OPG Mechanism:

There are several risks associated with the proposed OPG mechanism:

- Accountability
 - Bill attempts to balance the independence of the OPG trust with regulatory oversight and the market's need for certainty in recovering the GA financing that it provides.
 - Accountability to the government or the public, amount of government control of the entity, including future rate increases.
- New structure
 - The Structure is complex and involves:
 - IESO as originator of the regulated asset and responsible for flow of funds;
 - OEB as regulator of the new mechanism;
 - OPG responsible for financing and managing the mechanism; and

- The Province providing ongoing equity capital infusions to OPG and backstop.
- The addition of financial agency to the current operational obligations of OPG is not the current expertise of OPG. However, OPG has experience managing large financial assets and liabilities through the jointly managed Ontario Nuclear Funds as well as its own pension fund. In addition, this new role could possibly dilute OPG's focus on current high priority responsibilities (i.e., electricity generation and nuclear refurbishment).
- This financing structure would be unique to Canada – uniqueness reduces likelihood of all risks being known/mitigated. Highly specialized expertise would be required.
- There is a risk that at the next opportunity to review the OPG compensation framework, they make the case that there is no national comparator for this aspect of their work and they should therefore receive further exemptions from the rules (OPG nuclear executives do not need to find national comparators for compensation determination).
- It is unknown what the magnitude of transaction, administrative, and consultant costs that OPG would incur would be. OEB would review OPG's cost as the Financial Services Manager to ensure all are appropriate and can be recovered from the rate base.
- Debt
 - Opportunity for significant shifting of the Ontario's electricity sector over the lifespan of the repayment (30 years). Through sector/policy/government position shifting, possibility of new entity/structure abandoning debt and Ontario having to take a write down.
 - Risk transfer / portion of debt that Ontario would be responsible for would be the higher risk portion.
 - Repayment plan and impact on rate payers highly dependent on interest rates
- The public could claim that the government is simply putting off a problem and making it worse for future generations. The complexity of the structure may be seen as government attempting to cover up its actions.

Program Design and Implementation

The proposal relies heavily on LDCs as a partner for implementation. Many of these changes will need to take place simultaneously and amongst the 70 LDCs in Ontario there is variety in size, efficiency and ability to implement change.

- Program design will require an evaluation of whether the existing programs are effective and achieving their outcomes (e.g. the OESP has a current uptake of 30% and program changes are proposed in advance of an increased effort to reach 100% uptake)

- The OESP matrix no longer follows the Low Income Measure (LIM) which creates inconsistencies between how programs are applied and may put pressure other provincial programs to increase funding amounts.

Benefits for all Consumer Classes

OFHP includes some benefits for all consumer classes as well as targeted benefits to those with the greatest need. It is likely that the government will be criticized for providing benefits to those who may not be in need (e.g., wealthy cottage communities, etc.).

Connection to the Province's Next Long-Term Energy Plan

Ontario produces and publishes a Long-Term Energy Plan (LTEP) every three to four years, with the next LTEP scheduled for release in the summer of 2017. LTEP principles that will guide decision-making are affordability, reliability, clean energy, community and Indigenous engagement, and conservation. Through extensive consultation with the public, stakeholders and Indigenous partners through the fall of 2016, the Ministry has identified key priorities, and, Ontario's Fair Hydro Plan combined with new policy or program announcements in the LTEP, will provide the comprehensive future planning perspective for Ontario's energy sector. Note: The legislation associated with GA refinancing establishes a framework for the period after the ratepayer relief is set. By design, to achieve financing requirements there is limited control once the plan is set.

Stakeholder Considerations:

General public (including residential and small businesses) – Likely support a proposal that is projected to provide 25% in average rate relief (including the 8% announced in 2016) and other targeted relief for vulnerable Ontarians, but likely to question the longer term implications. Some individuals and organizations will perceive the GA refinancing as unduly burdening future generations. Ability of the public to understand current and recent changes will heavily depend on government communications.

Large Industrial and Commercial Consumers – Will continue to be concerned with the impact of cap and trade on electricity prices and the commitment in the Climate Change Action Plan to use GGRA funds to "keep electricity rate affordable". Will likely respond positively to the recent changes to expand ICI eligibility to some manufacturing and greenhouse Class B customers, but may be more neutral on the remainder of the initiatives.

The impact of cap and trade has been added to electricity bills as of January 2017. Class B consumers have raised concerns about the cost of electricity and its impact on their business competitiveness. Although Class A electricity consumers have access to ICI, they are also concerned about the impact of cap and trade on their electricity costs. They are expecting that GGRA funds will be used to mitigate their costs. There is an expectation government is going to take specific action to mitigate their increases due to cap and trade, and given the initiatives proposed in this submission, there is no plan to provide further relief through the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Account. **Note:** Funding

electricity support programs through the tax-base rather than the rate base will provide some saving to both Class A and B consumers.

Tenants – Likely to support any future price mitigation measures that directly benefit them; likely to react negatively if no mitigation measures target them.

Northern communities – Likely to support the targeted RRRP delivery relief.

Indigenous communities – First Nation members who live on reserves are likely to support the proposal because of the targeted delivery relief. Other Indigenous communities (i.e., Métis, non-status, First Nations without reserve land bases) are likely to react negatively at being excluded from the delivery charge relief.

eNGOs – May react negatively towards any price relief that is not directly tied to energy conservation. May criticize the inclusion of natural gas electricity generation as part of the “Clean Energy Adjustment.”

Solar PV sector – May react negatively to price relief as it can be seen to undercut the economics of net metering.

LDCs – Have expressed the need for an additional tool to provide assistance to their customers who are having difficulty with their electricity bills.

Delivery:

If passed, the legislation will enable the price mitigation measures to begin to take effect on July 1, 2017. The 2017 LTEP will be released to the public in the summer 2017 [TBC] and would reinforce/integrate with Ontario’s Fair Hydro Plan. Regulations are required under the major components of the legislation in order to fully implement the initiative and clarify program details.

1. Refinancing Global Adjustment assets in order to defer ratepayer costs / Mechanism to defer GA costs

[All elements- REPLACE WITH The rate payer benefit of OFHP will be in place as of July 1, 2017.

The establishment of the regulatory asset and purchase by OPG is expected to take three to six months to implement following the [introduction-replace with: coming into force] of enabling legislation. The IESO has requested a credit facility from the OFA to provide an interim source of financing.

The bill includes a transition provision in circumstances where for technical or operational reasons invoices cannot be adapted in time for the issuance of the first invoices under the program. In these cases, adaptation of invoices must be implemented by August 1, 2017 followed by a subsequent lump sum credit to the consumer once the invoice is adapted.

2. Enhancing Social and Conservation Programs

OESP Enhancements

Changes to regulation will be required to establish and define the parameters for the proposed changes. The financial flow-through mechanism would likely be modeled after processes used for the OREC (8% rebate). The amendments made in this bill allow for a transition period where the program continues to draw on the existing IESO variance account. IESO is required to notify the Ministry of Energy when it expects the variance account to be depleted (likely sometime in the fall).

The OEB and utilities already began making changes to their systems to implement the 50% credit increase and adding additional eligibility so that more households could qualify for the program. These changes are expected to be completed in time for the May 1, 2017 implementation date.

RRRP Enhancement

Regulations would be required to establish the details of the program. It is possible that for technical reasons not all LDCs will be able to implement the changes required under the program in time for the prescribed effective date (ENERGY is planning to prescribe July 1). The bill includes transitional provisions that would ensure customers remain eligible for the rate protection from the prescribed date. A mechanism will need to be created to ensure that all parties are aligned in the yearly forecasting and costing of the program.

On-Reserve First Nations Delivery Credit

The ministry is consulting with affected LDCs, the OEB, the IESO and Chiefs of Ontario (COO) to help develop a plan to identify eligible on-reserve consumers, as well as identify any potential implementation issues.

It is possible that for technical reasons not all LDCs will be able to implement the changes required under the program in time for the prescribed effective date (ENERGY is planning to prescribe July 1). The bill includes transitional provisions that would ensure customers remain eligible for the delivery credit from the prescribed date.

Once available, the rebate would appear on the eligible customer's electricity bills as a credit for their delivery line.

There is a risk that either non-status Indigenous communities without reserves or Metis could challenge the program on the grounds that it discriminates against them contrary to section 15 of the Charter. This risk is mitigated by the ameliorative purpose of the program and because targeting First Nations communities for a reserve-based program corresponds to the distinct circumstances of reserve-based communities, relative to other Indigenous communities. A genuinely ameliorative program that targets some people but excludes others is shielded from a section 15 challenge if it serves or advances the ameliorative goal.

Linkages:

Long-Term Energy Plan (LTEP) – Ontario is preparing to release a new LTEP in summer-fall 2017. These plans identify needs for investments over the shorter term, while broadly mapping out the direction of the sector over a 20 year timeframe. The LTEP will balance

the principles of affordability, reliability, clean energy, community and Indigenous engagement, as well as conservation and demand management.

Electricity Rate Mitigation Initiatives – The Ontario Rebate for Electricity for Electricity Consumers Act, 2016, (ORECA) put in place an 8% rebate for residential, small business customers and farms beginning January 1, 2017.

The Ontario Clean Energy Benefit (OCEB) was a five-year legislated program put in place as a broad-based, transitional measure to a cleaner electricity system. OCEB was also put in place following the implementation of the Harmonised Sales Tax (HST). Unlike the previous provincial Retail Sales Tax (RST), the HST (and GST) included electricity in the taxable base. OCEB program ended on December 31, 2015.

Debt Retirement Charge – On January 1, 2016 the government ended the electricity Debt Retirement Charge (DRC) on residential users earlier than planned, and put in place the low-income targeted OESP, effective 2016. For all other consumers the DRC is was removed by April 2018.

Industrial Conservation Initiative – Ministry of Energy program implemented in January 2011 to help large industrial consumers reduce their electricity costs by reducing electricity consumption in peak periods. As part of the Fair Hydro Plan, ICI eligibility was recently expanded to allow for the participation of the manufacturing and greenhouse sectors with an average month peak demand greater than 500 kilowatts (kW) and less than or equal to 1 megawatt (MW). ICI benefits all electricity consumers by decreasing the need for costly peaking generation over the long term.

Affordability Fund – approved as part of Ontario's Fair Hydro Plan, and under development, the Affordability Fund is intended to provide energy efficiency measures to Ontarians who are not eligible for low income conservation programs, and who are otherwise unable to make energy efficiency improvements without financial assistance.

Ontario's Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) – The CCAP, released in summer 2016, reiterated the 2016 Budget commitment and stated that Ontario intends to invest in initiatives that both reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and ensure that the net impact of cap and trade would not result in an overall increase in electricity costs for commercial and industrial consumers, and that there would be a modest benefit of up to \$2 per month, on average, to residential consumers. This commitment to residential consumers was exceeded by the January 2017 8% rebate.

The commitment to mitigate the cap and trade impact on electricity costs for commercial and industrial consumers (i.e., Class A and B) has not been fully addressed, though the two recent expansions to the ICI provides for significant potential savings. **Note:** Funding electricity support programs through the tax-base rather than the rate base will also provide saving to Class A and B consumers.

The CCAP committed to a new Climate Change agency that would act as one window for the delivery of climate change-related programs. The Green Ontario Fund (GreenON)- is tasked to develop programs and services designed to:

- Reduce greenhouse gas emissions from housing from buildings and the production of goods; and
- Increase uptake and overcome market barriers of low-carbon technologies and processes.

The CCAP committed that the government consult on and develop options to mitigate the impact of carbon pricing and resulting increased utility costs on residential tenants. The mitigation is proposed because tenants do not usually have the opportunity to make changes to their building envelope (e.g. windows, insulation) or major appliances that would allow them to address utility costs themselves. On April 24, 2017, the government introduced the Rental Fairness Act, 2017 which, if passed, would remove above-guideline rent increases for utilities, to protect tenants from carbon costs and encourage landlords to make their buildings more energy efficient.

Proposed Cabinet Minute

Approval of draft bill for introduction

Cabinet approved version **XX-XX** of this draft legislation for introduction, subject to the following:

1. The Office of Legislative Counsel is authorized to prepare a French version and to make minor adjustments to the English version, for the purpose of ensuring consistency between the two versions and making other improvements or correcting mistakes discovered in the translation process.
2. ENERGY to report back, pending Royal Assent, with regulation and associated regulatory amendments for approval.
3. ENERGY work with Cabinet Office and Premier's office to develop a communications plan.